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Abstract
This paper examines the response of husbands’and wives’earnings to a tax reform in which
husbands’and wives’tax rates changed independently, allowing me to examine the effect of both
spouses’incentives on each spouse’s behavior. I compare the results to those of more simplified
econometric models that are used in the typical setting in which such independent variation is
not available. Using administrative panel data on approximately 11% of the married Swedish
population, I analyze the impact of the large Swedish tax reform of 1990-1. I find that in response
to a compensated fall in one spouse’s tax rate, that spouse’s earned income rises, and the other
spouse’s earned income also rises. A standard econometric specification, in which one spouse reacts
to the other spouse’s income as if it were unearned income, yields biased coeffi cient estimates.
Uncompensated elasticities of earned income with respect to the fraction of income kept after
taxes are over-estimated by a factor of more than three, and income effects are of the wrong
sign. A second common specification, in which overall family income is related to the family’s tax
rate and income, also yields substantially over-estimated own compensated and uncompensated
elasticities. Standard econometric approaches may substantially mis-estimate earnings responses
to taxation.
1Email: agelber@nber.org. For helpful guidance, I am grateful to Philippe Aghion (the Editor), Hanley Chiang,
David Cutler, Martin Feldstein, Richard Freeman, Caroline Hoxby, Lawrence Katz, three anonymous referees, and
others too numerous to name individually. Per-Anders Edin deserves special thanks for his generosity in helping
to obtain data. I thank Håkan Björk, Hans Grönquist, Håkan Selin, and Marcus Vingren for graciously answering
questions regarding the data. An earlier draft of this paper circulated under the title "Taxation and Family Labor
Supply." NBER, the Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies, Uppsala University, IFAU, the Wharton Center for Human
Resources, the Wharton Zicklin Center, and NIA Grant Number T32-AG00186 provided generous financial support.
Part of this paper was completed while visiting at Uppsala University for a project with Per-Anders Edin. All errors
are my own.
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I. Introduction
Standard investigations of the impact of taxation on taxable income typically relate the family’s
overall taxable income to a measure of the family’s tax rate.2 In a parallel literature on the effect
of tax rates on labor supply, it is standard to relate a spouse’s labor supply decision to his or her
own tax rate.3 It has been typical to assume that an individual’s labor supply responds to the
income of his or her spouse as it would respond to unearned income, following a long tradition
beginning with Jacob Mincer (1962). In this paper, I relax these restrictions by examining how
independent variation in both spouses’tax rates impacts each spouse’s earnings decision. A richer
econometric model allowing for such independent variation shows that the simplifications inherent
in the standard approaches may lead to strongly biased results.
Swedish tax reforms in the early 1990s represent a particularly promising setting for studying
these issues, for three primary reasons. First, Sweden has individual taxation, meaning that an
individual’s marginal tax rate on earned income depends only on his or her own income. When the
Swedish tax schedule changes, husbands and wives face different changes in their marginal tax rates,
and the relative size of these changes differs across households, allowing me to identify the response
of one spouse’s income to the other spouse’s incentives.4 In the U.S., by contrast, married couples
are almost always taxed jointly on the sum of their incomes, implying that husbands and wives face
the same marginal tax rate. Second, I use the Longitudinal Individual Data for Sweden (LINDA),
which contain information on the separate income of each spouse, unlike the IRS-Michigan-NBER
Tax Panel on the U.S., which measures married couples’taxable income at the family level and
does not allow investigation of how each spouse’s income responds to incentives. The LINDA
data are a panel of detailed administrative data on the labor force activity, government program
participation, demographic characteristics, and other relevant features of approximately 11% of the
Swedish population, which allows me to estimate parameters precisely, including cross responses.
Third, from 1989 to 1991, the top marginal income tax rate in Sweden decreased from 76% to
51%, with substantial but smaller decreases in other tax brackets. This represents an opportunity
to examine labor supply responses to large exogenous changes in incentives.5
2This large literature includes Lindsey (1987), Feldstein (1995), Navratil (1995), Auten and Carroll (1997),
Sammartino and Weiner (1997), Saez (1999), Goolsbee (1999), Moffi tt and Wilhelm (2000), Saez (2004), Kopczuk
(2005), Giertz (2007), Saez (2010), and Singleton (2011). See Joel Slemrod, Saez, and Seth Giertz (2009) for a
review.
3Examples include Jerry Hausman (1981), Nada Eissa (1995), and Richard Blundell, Alan Duncan, and Costas
Meghir (1998).
4I use “own response,”“own elasticity,”or “own effect”to refer to the reaction to one’s own tax rate or income,
and “cross response,”“cross elasticity,”or “cross effect”to refer to the reaction to the tax rate or income of one’s
spouse.
5Raj Chetty (2010) argues that large reforms give much more precise parameter estimates, and Chetty, John
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With a specification allowing for cross responses, I estimate a rich set of parameters, including
own and cross income and substitution effects for both husbands and wives. Standard econometric
models, in which one’s own income or hours worked is assumed to respond to spousal income as it
responds to unearned income, cannot reflect the possibility that the spouse’s tax rate could have
both income and substitution effects on one’s earnings. The literature examining the response
of families’taxable income to the marginal tax rates they face leaves open the question of how
husbands’and wives’decisions separately contribute to families’aggregate responses, and implicitly
assumes that the family can be treated as if it reacted to one (family) unearned income.
The results show that husbands and wives react to each other’s marginal tax rates and unearned
incomes, as well as to their own. My central estimates show compensated elasticities of individuals’
earned income with respect to their own net-of-tax share of .41 and .47 for husbands and wives,
respectively.6 Compensated cross elasticities are .05 and .07, respectively, implying that in response
to a compensated decrease in one spouse’s tax rate, both spouses’earned incomes rise. Elasticities
of earned income with respect to own unearned income are large (-.07 and -.05 for husbands and
wives, respectively) and precisely estimated. I estimate elasticities of own earned income with
respect to spouses’unearned income of -.003 for husbands and -.02 for wives.
I find that standard econometric models, which make various simplifications, may yield very
different results. I first assume that one spouse’s earned income responds to the other spouse’s
income as it reacts to unearned income. This yields an estimate of the income effect that is large
and of the wrong sign. When a husband’s marginal tax rate falls, he works more, and the estimates
imply that his wife works more, as well. This induces a spurious positive correlation between the
change in the measure of the husband’s unearned income (which includes his wife’s income) and the
change in the husband’s own earnings. Thus, the estimated coeffi cient on the husband’s unearned
income, which represents the income effect on his earnings, is overly positive.7 For both husbands
and wives, this specification also produces an estimate of the uncompensated earnings elasticity
that is biased upward by a factor of more than three, as well as an over-estimate of the compensated
elasticity. A standard assumption from the parallel literature on the elasticity of taxable income is
that the family’s overall earnings reacts to the net-of-tax share and overall family unearned income.
Friedman, Luigi Pistaferri, and Tore Olsen (2010) argue that large reforms may give estimates closer to long-run
labor supply elasticities. Indeed, Chetty (2010) argues that because my paper examines a large reform in Sweden,
I perform much more precise parameter estimates than other papers on income responses to taxation.
6The net-of-tax share is defined as one minus the marginal tax rate. It is noteworthy that the female earned
income elasticity is somewhat higher than the elasticity for men, even in a country known for its relative gender
equality and high female labor force participation rate.
7Analogous reasoning implies that the estimated coeffi cient on the wife’s unearned income should be overly
positive.
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This specification likewise produces divergent results, with the compensated and uncompensated
own elasticity substantially over-estimated and the uncompensated cross elasticity substantially
under-estimated. Other specifications frequently run in the literature, including specifications
omitting unearned income, also produce substantially biased results. Because these lessons are
methodological—reflecting whether standard approaches produce correct results—I argue that the
results are relevant to our understanding of these methods in contexts both inside and outside
Sweden.
Since I estimate own and cross uncompensated and compensated effects, I am able to perform
two separate tests of a unitary model of family taxpaying decisions. The unitary model is defined
by the feature that the family can be characterized as maximizing a single utility function. I
reject a unitary model based on violations of the "income pooling condition," which implies in this
context that a married individual’s pre-tax earnings should react equally to an increase in that
individual’s unearned income as it reacts to an increase in the unearned income of his or her spouse.8
The unitary model also predicts that the Slutsky matrix should be symmetric: the compensated
response of the husband’s pre-tax earnings to the net-of-tax rate of the wife is predicted to be equal
to the compensated response of the wife’s pre-tax earnings to the net-of-tax rate of the husband.
I cannot reject Slutsky symmetry at conventional significance levels.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the empirical specification. Section III
describes the policy environment and other relevant features of the Swedish economy in the period
under consideration. Section IV describes the data. Section V presents the empirical results and
relates them to a unitary model of family taxpaying decisions. Section VI concludes.
II. Empirical Model
A. Basic Framework
The primary goal of the paper is to estimate the causal effect of husbands’and wives’net-of-tax
rates and unearned incomes on their earnings. Following Gruber and Saez (2002) and the literature
cited therein, my empirical model relates the change in an individual’s log real pre-tax earnings to
the change in the individual’s log net-of-tax rate and the change in the individual’s log real after-
tax unearned income. Relating the logs of the variables yields coeffi cient estimates interpretable
8More generally, the income pooling condition states that a married individual’s consumption of any good should
react equally to an increase in that individual’s unearned income as it reacts to an increase in the unearned income
of his or her spouse. See Shelly Lundberg, Robert Pollak, and Terence Wales (1997) for an alternative test of
income pooling in a developed country.
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as elasticities. In addition, as Gruber and Saez write (p. 10), "For large tax changes, it is perhaps
more natural to use a log—log specification that is also closer to previous studies’specifications.”
It is illuminating to follow a specification that has been estimated in previous literature, as the
results under alternative specifications can then be compared in a straightforward way to what
has been estimated in previous work.
I extend the Gruber and Saez (2002) specification to allow each spouse’s earnings to depend not
only on his or her own tax rate and unearned income, but also on the tax rate and unearned income
of the other spouse. This represents a natural extension, since one spouse’s tax rate and unearned
income are likely to influence the earnings of the other spouse if spouses’decisions interact. The
log of a spouse’s earned income, ln(Esit), is specified as a function of the log of that individual’s
net-of-tax share (i.e. the log of one minus that individual’s marginal tax rate), ln(1− τ sit), the log
of the other spouse’s net-of-tax share, ln(1− τ−sit ), the log of the individual’s own income, ln(Y sit),
and the log of the other spouse’s income, ln(Y −sit ). Here the superscript s ∈ {h,w} represents
the individual in question, whereas −s denotes that individual’s spouse, and h and w refer to the
husband and wife, respectively. i indexes couples, and t represents the time period.
To remove individual-level fixed effects that may be correlated with the tax and income variables
of interest, the model will be estimated in first differences, again following Gruber and Saez (2002):
∆ ln(Ehit) = β
h
0 + β
h
1∆ ln(1− τhit) + βh2∆ ln(1− τwit) + βh3∆ ln(Y hit ) + βh4∆ ln(Y wit )
+XhiTβ
h
h +X
w
iTβ
h
w + ϑ
h
t + ε
h
it (1)
∆ ln(Ewit ) = β
w
0 + β
w
1 ∆ ln(1− τwit) + βw2 ∆ ln(1− τhit) + βw3 ∆ ln(Y wit ) + βw4 ∆ ln(Y hit )
+XwiTβ
w
w +X
h
iTβ
w
h + ϑ
w
t + ε
w
it (2)
where ∆ ln(Zt) represents the change from t− 1 to t in the log of Z. (I use “base year”to indicate
t−1, the initial year in each pair of years over which the first difference is taken, and “final year”to
refer to t, the last year in each pair of years over which the first difference is taken.) The subscript
t still appears in the empirical model since multiple first differences will be used. Time dummies
ϑst control for economy-wide earned income growth specific to each period over which the first
difference is taken. εhit and ε
w
it are error terms. X
h
iT and X
w
iT represent other variables– age, age
squared, education, region, number of children, industry, occupation, and sometimes interactions
of the covariates– that control for other factors that could influence changes in earned income.
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The control variables bear the subscript T , which refers to an initial period.
B. Discussion of Specification
The dependent variable, the change in the log of real earned income, may best reflect the welfare
consequences of taxation among the variables commonly observed in tax datasets, as discussed in
Chetty (2009).9 The response of earned income is straightforward to examine because in the data,
the definitions of several types of capital income changed from before to after the Tax Reform
of 1991. In some regressions, I also examine how a measure of taxable labor income, formed by
subtracting a set of deductions from earned income, responds to the net-of-tax share.10
The specification relates earnings to the net-of-tax share, which is the accepted standard spec-
ification in the tax literature. Indeed, the literature on taxable labor income responses to taxation
has essentially exclusively adopted this specification, including Lindsey (1987), Feldstein (1995),
Navratil (1995), Auten and Carroll (1997), Sammartino and Weiner (1997), Saez (1999), Goolsbee
(1999), Moffi tt and Wilhelm (2000), Saez (2004), Kopczuk (2005), Hansson (2007), Giertz (2007),
Holmlund and Söderstrom (2008), Heim (2009), Saez (2010), Chetty, Friedman, Olsen and Pista-
ferri (2011), and Singleton (2011).11 However, it is important to note that in all of this literature,
including in my paper, the incidence of a tax cut could also affect the estimates. Standard eco-
nomic theory predicts that the incidence of a tax cut should be shared between employees and
employers. In particular, in a framework in which workers are offered an hourly wage and choose
their hours worked, a tax cut should lead to a fall in the pre-tax wage (assuming that labor supply
is not completely inelastic and labor demand is not infinitely elastic) and a rise in the after-tax
wage. Changes in earnings will therefore reflect both changes in hours worked and changes in the
pre-tax hourly wage. Differences in earnings elasticities across groups, such as men and women,
could reflect both differences in the labor supply or demand elasticities across these groups.12 Feld-
stein (1995) and Blomquist and Selin (2010) add a further twist to this literature, arguing that
the pre-tax wage may change because individuals put forth more effort in response to tax cuts.
I follow the theoretical and empirical framework in Gruber and Saez (2002) and the literature
cited above in abstracting from these issues by relating earnings to net-of-tax shares and virtual
9I also follow the suggestion of Chetty (2009) and explore the response of measures of non-wage compensation
to the tax rate.
10Feldstein (1999) develops a measure of the deadweight loss of taxation in terms of the elasticity of taxable labor
income with respect to the net-of-tax share, but the empirical literature has focused on the elasticity of taxable
income (including capital income) with respect to the net-of-tax share. By investigating the elasticity of taxable
labor income, I estimate a parameter that more closely corresponds to Feldstein’s (1999) model.
11Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2009) review papers that rely on this specification.
12In a model in which employers and employees bargain, the incidence of a tax cut could also reflect employers’
and employees’bargaining power.
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incomes. This is often defended on the grounds that empirical work tends to find no evidence of
an impact of taxation on the pre-tax wage, and finds instead that taxes affect the after-tax wage,
consistent with a model in which labor supply is much more inelastic than labor demand (e.g.
Anderson and Meyer 2000).
The specification adopted in all of the literature cited above, as well as in my paper, implicitly
assumes that changes in hourly wages are uncorrelated with changes in taxes (since changes in
hourly wages could affect earnings). If they were correlated, this could lead to biased and inconsis-
tent coeffi cients on the tax rate. However, I am able to address this limitation further than much
of this previous literature has, because I have information on various demographics that are likely
to be correlated with hourly wage changes over time. In particular, I am able to control for age,
education, region, number of children, two-digit industry, and two-digit occupation. In the data
used in most previous literature, most of these demographic variables have not been available,
including occupation and industry. The additional controls prove to make little difference to the
results.
When observations of earnings E are zero, the log of earnings is undefined. This implies that
when earnings are zero, with the log-log specification, observations in which earnings are zero in
either the base year or the final year would be set to missing. This would in turn imply that
the sample would be selected according to values of the dependent variable: only observations of
the dependent variable for which earnings are non-zero in both the base year and the final year
would be included in the regressions. Selecting the sample according to values of the dependent
variable in general leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of coeffi cients (e.g. James Heckman
1979). To address this, I find a way of including these observations in the regressions by adding
one to earnings and then logging earnings. This implies that zeroes of earnings are not treated as
missing.13 The dependent variable for spouse s in couple i is therefore ln[(1 + Esit)/(1 + E
s
it−1)],
and the notation in (1) and (2) can be considered shorthand for this expression. As I show in the
Appendix, the results are generally insensitive to other choices, such as adding .5 before taking
the log. In another specification, I exclude from the regressions those who exited the labor force.
I log earnings (without adding anything to earnings before logging earnings), so that the sample
is limited to those with positive earnings in both periods, and the results are again similar to the
basic results. This further demonstrates that the results do not hinge on the choice to add one to
earnings before logging earnings.
13Other literature has adopted this technique for including zeroes in the estimates (e.g. Kuziemko and Werker
2006).
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Because the prediction of Slutsky symmetry of the unitary model of family responses to taxation
(discussed further below) only holds when both spouses participate in the labor market, I exclude
couples from my main regressions in those pairs of years in which at least one member of the
couple does not participate in the labor market in the base year. The measure of income used as
an independent variable is “virtual income,”which represents the intersection of the individual’s
extended budget segment in consumption-effort space with the Y-axis. The construction of virtual
income is discussed at greater length in Appendix I.14
In the main regressions, I consider two sets of one-year differences, which are pooled in the
regressions: one from 1989-1990, and the other from 1990-1991. These are the years of the tax
reform. This strategy will identify a short-term effect of the changes in the tax schedule.15 The
main source of exogenous variation is that in TR91, marginal tax rates were reduced much more
for those at the top of the income distribution than for those at the bottom. This generates very
large exogenous variation across households and time in the net-of-tax shares of husbands relative
to their wives. For example, suppose that in Couple 1, the wife is in the lowest tax bracket, and
the husband is in the highest tax bracket (both before and after the reform). In Couple 2, both
the husband and wife are in the highest tax bracket (both before and after the reform). Those in
the highest tax bracket receive a large cut in their marginal tax rate, whereas those in the lowest
bracket receive a small cut. Therefore, due to the tax reform, the net-of-tax share of the husband
relative to that of the wife increases in Couple 1 but stays constant in Couple 2. Thus, I can
effectively relate the changes over time in the relative earnings of the husbands and wives in the
two couples, to the changes over time and couples in their relative net-of-tax shares (and to the
changes in virtual incomes associated with these tax changes and any simultaneous changes in
capital taxation).16
C. Instruments
The actual marginal tax rate that an individual faces is potentially endogenous. For example,
if an individual responds to an increase in his or her own marginal tax rate by decreasing his or
her earned income, and marginal tax rates are progressive, then an OLS estimate of the effect of
the net-of-tax share on earned income will be biased downward. Thus, it is typical to instrument
14Gary Burtless and Hausman (1978) explain virtual income and why it is the appropriate income measure for
estimating income effects in the presence of a nonlinear budget set.
15Gruber and Saez (2002) find relatively similar elasticities at 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year intervals.
16My regressions in fact allow for more flexibility than a specification that literally related the relative earnings
of the spouses to their relative net-of-tax shares, because I run separate regressions for husbands and wives and
enter each spouse’s net-of-tax share separately in each regression.
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for the net-of-tax share with a so-called “simulated instrument.” This instrument is constructed
by calculating the change in the net-of-tax share that would have occured if the individual had
maintained the behavior he or she exhibited in the initial period (Gruber and Saez 2002). The
intuitive notion that underlies this procedure is that the change in the tax schedule is exogenous to
individuals’initial behavior, so the value of this instrument will not be affected by the endogenous
response to the new tax schedule.
In particular, the instrument is constructed by projecting final year taxable income to be base
year taxable income for spouse s in couple i, Zsit−1, multiplied by the growth of mean taxable
income per taxpayer in the sample, (1 + g). Letting Ẑsit be projected taxable income, I set
Ẑsit = (1 + g)Z
s
it−1. Suppose that the net-of-tax share (as a function of taxable income) before
the tax change is given by Tt−1() and the net-of-tax share after the tax change is given by Tt().
I use Tt(Ẑsit) − Tt−1(Zsit−1) to instrument for Tt(Zsit) − Tt−1(Zsit−1). In the regressions relating to
the extensive margin, the average after-tax share is instrumented analogously. Because virtual
income for spouse s in couple i in year t, Y s,vit (), varies according to which budget segment the
individual locates on, it is a function of actual taxable income.17 Thus, virtual income is also
potentially endogenous. I construct a simulated instrument for the actual change in virtual
income, by predicting the change in virtual income that would have occurred, if the individual had
projected taxable income Ẑsit in the final period. In other words, I use Y
s,v
it (Ẑ
s
it)− Y
s,v
it−1(Z
s
it−1) as
an instrument for Y s,vit (Z
s
it)− Y
s,v
it−1(Z
s
it−1).
18
Following previous literature (e.g. Hausman 1981; Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz 1990;
Blomquist and Selin 2010), my empirical specification effectively assumes that the response to
actual income shocks and virtual income shocks is the same. Variation in virtual income therefore
comes from three sources. First, virtual income is influenced by changes in actual pre-tax unearned
income. Second, virtual income is influenced by changes in the average tax rate on capital income,
since this influences after-tax unearned income. Third, virtual income is influenced by changes in
the marginal tax rate on labor income.
17Y s,vit () is subscripted by i because it also depends on capital income and government transfers, which vary by
individual.
18Since each spouse’s tax rate on capital income was potentially different prior to the reform (because each
spouse’s capital income was taxed separately), this created an incentive for couples to avoid taxes by allocating
capital income to the lower-taxed spouse. However, this does not affect my estimates because I instrument for
the actual change in virtual income using the change that would have been expected on the basis of the different
components of pre-reform virtual income. The estimation procedure therefore effectively throws away any variation
coming from individuals’endogenous responses to the new tax schedule, and therefore throws away any variation
relating to re-allocation of capital income. It is also worth noting that capital income has been taxed at a flat rate
of 30% since the 1991 reform, thus eliminating any incentive for couples to re-allocate their assets to the lower-taxed
spouse.
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However, variation in predicted changes in virtual income, which serves as the instrument
for virtual income, comes from only two sources. First, predicted virtual income is influenced
by changes in the tax rate on capital income, since this influences after-tax predicted unearned
income. Changes in tax policy toward capital income (discussed below) therefore drive variation
in predicted virtual income. Second, predicted virtual income is influenced by changes in policy
affecting the marginal tax rate on labor income, because this affects the slope of the budget segment
in question and therefore its intersection with the y-axis. It is important to note that these changes
in the marginal tax rate on labor income also have an effect on earnings that operates through the
resulting change in the net-of-tax share on labor income, which in the empirical model has a direct
effect on earnings. As in previous literature (e.g. Hausman 1981), changes in predicted virtual
income arising from changes in the marginal tax rate on labor income are therefore correlated with
changes in the net-of-tax share on labor income. As in this previous literature, therefore, to the
extent that variation in predicted virtual income is driven by changes in the marginal tax rate on
labor income, the coeffi cient on (instrumented) virtual income will be separately identified from
the coeffi cient on the (instrumented) net-of-tax share owing to functional form restrictions.
It is important to note, however, that since changes in predicted virtual income are also influ-
enced by changes in capital income tax policy, part of the variation in predicted virtual income is
not mechanically related to variation in the predicted net-of-tax share on labor income. In addi-
tion, it is worth noting that percentage changes in predicted virtual income are not influenced by
changes in actual income, since predicted virtual income is calculated using lagged virtual income.
D. Controlling for the Evolution of the Income Distribution
In their regressions relating taxable income to the net-of-tax share and an income effect, Gruber
and Saez (2002) control for a ten-piece spline in the log of base year real income. Since the
size of the tax change is correlated with income, it may be diffi cult empirically to tease apart
variation in base-year income from variation in the change in marginal tax rates. Indeed, Gruber
and Saez (2002) write that using rich controls for base-year income “may destroy identification.
This problem is especially acute when the size of the tax rate change is directly correlated with
the income level as in the TRA of 1986...In practice, rich controls for base year income make it
very diffi cult to separately identify income and substitution effects with only one tax change.”
(pp. 11-12). Because I examine only one tax reform, over-controlling for base year income is a
major cause for concern. Given the correlation between base year income and the change in the
marginal tax rate, the regression results may be highly sensitive to mis-specification, for example
10
of the functional form with which base year income enters.
To address this issue, I calibrate the evolution of the income distribution using a period in which
no major tax change occurs, and I assume that absent the tax change, the income distribution
would have evolved similarly during the period of the change. I then relate the remaining variation
in earned income to exogenous variation in the marginal tax rate, controlling for a rich set of
covariates that can capture effects unique to the period of the tax change. I begin this procedure
by performing the following regression during a period in which the change in the tax schedule is
negligible:
∆ ln(Esit) = ξ
s
0 + f [ln(E
s
it−1)]ξ
s
E,s + f [ln(E
−s
it−1)]ξ
s
E,−s + f [ln(Z
s
it−1)]ξ
s
Z,s
+f [ln(Z−sit−1)]ξ
s
Z,−s +X
s
iT ξ
s
s +X
−s
iT ξ
s
−s + υ
s
it (3)
Here f is a ten-piece spline in lagged log real income, s denotes the spouse in question, and -s
denotes the other spouse. I use ten-piece splines in one’s own lagged log real earned income,
one’s spouse’s lagged log real earned income, one’s own lagged log real taxable income, and one’s
spouse’s lagged log real taxable income. I include a ten-piece spline in lagged log real taxable
income because in the main regressions of interest, changes in log real earned income will be related
to changes in marginal tax rates. Marginal tax rates are computed based on taxable income, so
controlling for lagged log real taxable income addresses possible mean reversion relating to taxable
income. The knots of the spline are placed at deciles of the income distribution. ξhE,h, ξ
h
E,w,
ξhZ,h, ξ
h
Z,w, ξ
w
E,w, ξ
w
E,h, ξ
w
Z,w, and ξ
w
Z,h represent vectors of coeffi cients on these splines.
These regressions yield an estimated set of coeffi cients ξ̂
h
E,h, ξ̂
h
E,w, ξ̂
h
Z,h, ξ̂
h
Z,w, ξ̂
w
E,w, ξ̂
w
E,h, ξ̂
w
Z,w, and
ξ̂
w
Z,h, which collectively calibrate how income evolves in the absence of a tax change. In the later
period that spans the tax change, I use these estimated coeffi cients to partial out the predicted
effect of base year income, thus creating residual changes in the log of real earned income, ∆̃ ln(Esit),
for the wife and the husband:
∆̃ ln(Esit) = ∆ ln(E
s
it)− f [ln(Esit−1)]ξ̂
s
E,s − f [ln(E−sit−1)]ξ̂
s
E,−s
−f [ln(Zsit−1)]ξ̂
s
Z,s − f [ln(Z−sit−1)]ξ̂
s
Z,−s (4)
These residuals represent the remaining variation in the change in earned income, with the pre-
dicted effect of lagged income removed. I now modify equations (1) and (2), relating the residuals
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to the independent variables:
∆̃ ln(Esit) = β
s
0 + β
s
1∆ ln(1− τ sit) + βs2∆ ln(1− τ−sit )
+βs3∆ ln(Y
s
it) + β
s
4∆ ln(Y
−s
it ) +X
s
iTβ
s
s +X
−s
iT β
s
−s + ϑ
s
t + ε
s
it (5)
I instrument for tax rates and virtual incomes using the simulated instruments described earlier.
The procedure described in this section is conceptually similar to a “triple difference”strategy,
in which the differences across couples over time are contrasted between a period of no policy
change and a period of a policy change. The assumption is that the influence of all of the factors
that are unique to the period spanning the tax change can be removed with the controls. I control
extensively for occupation, industry, region, education, and several other demographic variables.
The evidence is consistent with the contention that this procedure removes the true effect of lagged
income and business cycle effects, since adding more extensive controls makes little difference to
the estimated coeffi cients of interest.19
E. Implications of the Unitary Model for the Parameter Estimates
The unitary model of family decision-making is defined by the feature that the family’s behavior
can be characterized as maximizing a single utility function.20 This yields two central predictions
(Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). First, income pooling: the husband’s (wife’s) earnings should react
equally to a change in his (her) own unearned income as to a change in his wife’s (her husband’s)
unearned income. This condition holds because the family does not distinguish between the
unearned income of the husband and the unearned income of the wife in making its labor effort
and consumption decisions; rather, the household acts as a single agent that pools its unearned
income and reacts to it the same whether its source is the husband or wife. Second, Slutsky
symmetry: The compensated response of the husband’s earnings to the wife’s net-of-tax wage
should be equal to the compensated response of the wife’s earnings to the husband’s net-of-tax
wage. Standard consumer demand theory implies this condition. The family has a single utility
function, so the Slutsky matrix for the consumption of goods, including the effort of the husband
19My procedure also bears a conceptual resemblance to the empirical strategy of Lawrence Lindsey (1987).
Lindsey predicts how much taxable income should exist in each part of the income distribution, absent the tax
change. The difference between the actual amount of taxable income in each part of the distribution and the
predicted amount is then attributed to the effect of taxation. My procedure performs a similar comparison, but
differs from the Lindsey strategy by employing panel data, rather than repeated cross sections.
20It is important to emphasize that the paper’s empirical specification is not explicitly derived from the unitary
model (whose validity is in fact called into question by the empirical results). The empirical specification instead
builds on a long tradition of other work in the taxable income literature that has adopted similar specifications, as
cited above.
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and wife, must be symmetric about the diagonal.21 Since the empirical model is specified in terms
of elasticities, I transform the coeffi cient estimates to relate them to the predictions of the unitary
model. For individuals at the sample means of income, income pooling implies:
βh3 Ȳ
w = βh4 Ȳ
h (6)
and
βw3 Ȳ
h = βw4 Ȳ
w (7)
where bars above the income variables represent their sample mean values.22
To test Slutsky symmetry, begin by recalling the Slutsky relation:
∂Eh
∂(1− τw) |u =
∂Eh
∂(1− τw) − E
w ∂E
h
∂Y w
(8)
∂Ew
∂(1− τh) |u =
∂Ew
∂(1− τh) − E
h∂E
w
∂Y h
(9)
After performing transformations to express the elasticity estimates as marginal effects, the fol-
lowing equality is implied by Slutsky symmetry, evaluated at the sample means of the variables:
βh2
Ēh
1− τ̄w − Ē
wβh4
Ēh
Ȳ w
= βw2
Ēw
1− τ̄h − Ē
hβw4
Ēw
Ȳ h
(10)
III. The Tax Reform of 1991
The Tax Reform of 1991 changed income tax rates dramatically, as the top marginal tax rate
fell from 76% to 51%.23 TR91 revised several other aspects of the tax system, including the VAT
21The traditional unitary model applies in the context of hours worked responses to net-of-tax wages. The Slutsky
symmetry prediction stated above– that the compensated response of the husband’s earnings to the wife’s net-of-tax
wage should be equal to the compensated response of the wife’s earnings to the husband’s net-of-tax wage– follows
from the Slutsky symmetry of the traditional unitary model if in the empirical estimation, changes in hourly wages
across individuals are uncorrelated with changes in net-of-tax shares. If this is true, then the elasticity of hours
worked with respect to the net-of-tax hourly wage will be the same as the elasticity of earnings with respect to the
net-of-tax share. Similarly, if changes in hourly wages are uncorrelated with changes in virtual unearned income,
then the estimated elasticity of hours worked with respect to unearned income will be the same as the estimated
elasticity of earnings with respect to unearned income. In this case, all of the predictions of the traditional unitary
model will carry over to the context of the relationship between earnings and the net-of-tax share. These predictions
also follow from a framework similar to one adopted in Gruber and Saez (2002) or Saez (2010), in which individuals
derive utility from pre-tax earnings as well as (after-tax) consumption. If family utility is defined over the pre-tax
earnings of the husband and wife, as well as the family’s consumption, and regularity conditions are satisfied, then
Slutsky symmetry and income pooling, as exposited below, should hold.
22In my tests, I use the sample mean values from 1989, before the tax change. I also test these predictions for
individuals at other points in the income distribution and find similar results.
23A detailed description and analysis of TR91 can be found in Jonas Agell, Peter Englund, and Jan Södersten
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and corporate taxes. The period considered in this paper includes two tax reductions, from 1989-
1990 and 1990-1991, the latter of which was substantially larger. Table 1 shows the tax schedule
for the national Swedish government, called the “state tax schedule," in 1989 and 1991. Marginal
tax rates fell substantially for those at the top of the income distribution but fell little for those
at the bottom. Before TR91, the state tax schedule was comprised of two different schedules, the
basic schedule and the additional schedule. Basic taxable income differed from additional taxable
income because a number of deductions could be taken on the basic schedule that could not be
taken on the additional schedule. The total state marginal tax rate was calculated by summing
the basic marginal tax rate and the additional marginal tax rate. Starting in 1991, the distinction
between basic and additional taxable income was eliminated, and income was taxed according to
a single state tax schedule.
Prior to 1991, Sweden had a global tax system, under which earned income and capital income
were taxed at the same marginal tax rate, calculated on the basis of an individual’s earned income,
taxable government transfers, capital income, and deductions. Starting in 1991, Sweden changed
to a dual tax system, under which the marginal tax rate on earned income is computed only
based on earned income (and taxable government transfers and deductions), and capital income
is taxed at the flat rate of 30%. These changes in the taxation of unearned income provide
sizeable exogenous variation in after-tax unearned income, thus aiding in the identification of
income effects. In the Swedish system, each spouse has their own separate assets and capital
income. The simulated instrument approach described above isolates the effect of a labor income
tax policy reform by calculating the change in the net-of-tax share that would have occured if
the individual had maintained the behavior he or she exhibited in the initial period. In much
the same way, the simulated instrument for each spouse’s change in after-tax unearned (virtual)
income will isolate the effect of the changes in capital tax policy on the earnings of each spouse
by calculating the change in after-tax unearned income that would have occured if the individual
had maintained the behavior he or she exhibited in the initial period, thereby effectively treating
each spouse’s pre-reform capital income as given.
The reform also broadened the tax base, to make up for the revenue lost due to the tax cuts.
For example, before 1991, nominal interest expenses were fully deductible against typically high
(1998). This section and the next also often draw on the description of TR91 in Martin Ljunge and Kelly Ragan
(2005). Many important features of the reform had been anticipated since 1987, when a commission began to
plan the reform. Åsa Hansson (2007) also examines the Swedish Tax Reform of 1991, focusing on the response
of individuals’earned income to taxation and assuming that one spouse reacts to the other’s income as if it were
unearned income. Bertil Holmlund and Martin Söderstrom (2008) examine reforms following the 1991 reform.
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marginal income tax rates, whereas after the reform, they were deductible against the lower capital
income tax rate of 30%. Due to such broadening of the base, deductions and exclusions fell as
a share of total income. The reform was designed to be almost revenue-neutral. The Swedish
Ministry of Finance (1991) projected that 89.1 billion Swedish Kronor (SEK) would be lost due
to the tax cuts, and that SEK 8.2 billion would be lost due to increased spending planned for
1991. However, the projections indicated that SEK 95.1 billion would be recouped through the
combination of base broadening (SEK 79.6 billion), dynamic gains from increased economic activity
in response to the tax cuts (SEK 5.0 billion), and increases in other revenues (SEK 10.4 billion).
The total marginal tax rate is calculated as the sum of local, municipal and state tax rates. The
mean value of the sum of local and municipal rates is 31% (both before and after the reform).24 It
is possible to construct an alternative measure of the marginal tax rate that includes the phase-outs
and phase-ins of the basic deduction and of various transfers (such as a housing-related transfer).
Ultimately, how much individuals respond to such incentives is an empirical question, and the
results are similar when other measures of the marginal tax rate are employed.
I use the evolution of the income distribution from 1988 to 1989 to calibrate how the income
distribution develops. I use these years because they are temporally adjacent to the TR91 changes
in 1990-1991, and thus it is likely that the nature of the evolution of the income distribution did
not change much by the 1989-1991 period; because there were no other substantial policy changes
in 1988-1989 that could affect the evolution of earnings; and because these years are before TR91,
so individuals are not still reacting to the policy changes. 1986 or 1987 could in principle also be
candidates for years on which to estimate the evolution of the income distribution, even though
they are further removed from 1990-1991. However, in 1986 and 1987, the measure of income in the
LINDA data includes both earned income and government transfers, so there is no way to separately
measure earnings without including government transfers. Sweden has large government transfers
(such as unemployment compensation, sick leave, parental leave, or welfare), and government
transfers comprise a large fraction of income. The period immediately following TR91 also has
limitations because of a number of policies likely to affect labor force participation were enacted
in 1992. Under Sweden’s 1992 Equal Opportunity Act, employers were required to try to obtain
a well-balanced sex distribution in various jobs and must make it easier for workers to combine
work and family (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 2005; Melkas and Anker 1998). In addition, in 1992
24We use 31% in the absence of information about these rates. It affects the results little when we instead proxy
for these rates using the individual’s actual state and local tax liability divided by their assessed income. This is
unsurprising, since state and local rates showed almost no movement during this time period, and the regression is
first-differenced.
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legislation was enacted that cut funding for public daycare (Mahon 1997). Both of these policy
shifts are likely to have substantially affected labor force participation differentially at different
income levels. Finally, individuals may still have been reacting to the major changes in tax policy
in the period following 1991, as adjustment costs may prevent immediate adjustment to policy
changes (e.g. Holmlund and Söderstrom 2008 on Sweden or Chetty 2010). However, I obtain
results in the same range when I additionally use 1991-2 to calibrate the evolution of the income
distribution, rather than 1988-1989.25
Like most empirical estimates, the estimates must be interpreted as local in the sense that they
may not generalize outside of the particular context studied. For example, although tax changes
throughout the income distribution are included in the estimation, the tax cuts were largest near
the top of the income distribution, and thus a large portion of the useful variation comes from tax
cuts in this part of the income distribution. As another example, my estimates are largely based
on tax reductions.26 It is possible that tax reductions have a different impact on earnings than tax
increases do, as it may be easier or more diffi cult to increase labor supply than to decrease it for
a variety of reasons.
Some features of the Swedish macroeconomic environment are shown in Figure 1. The dashed
line represents real percentage GDP growth per capita. Sweden entered a recession in late 1990,
with real per capita GDP growth rates of 1.0% and -1.1% in 1990 and 1991, respectively. The solid
line shows the unemployment rate, which increased substantially during the recession.27 To control
for the influence of these macroeconomic factors, I control for a rich set of covariates, including
dummies for 2-digit industry codes, 2-digit occupation codes, and other covariates interacted with
year. Income effects could also have come not only from changes in capital income measured in
the data, but also by the changes in wealth induced by the macroeconomic environment or by the
capitalization of changes in the tax rules into asset prices. A particular source of concern is that
housing prices in Sweden fell substantially around the time of the reform. The results are similar
25Data from far before or after the period of TR91 are less likely to reflect the same earnings dynamics, as the
autoregressive process characterizing the evolution of earnings may change substantially over time (e.g. Gottschalk
and Moffi tt 1994). Data from prior to 1986 are also likely to be confounded by other factors. A series of large tax
cuts over the period from 1981 to 1986 are likely to have affected the evolution of the income distribution in ways
that are not replicated in other years. The 1995 tax increase for upper-income individuals, as well as the 1994
changes in capital income taxation, are also likely to confound comparisons in later years.
26The estimates are not entirely based on tax reductions because the tax base also changed in TR91, which
resulted in a rise in the marginal (or average) tax rate for some individuals.
27It is possible to argue that this macroeconomic turmoil could help me to uncover family labor supply responses.
During a period of economic calm, couples may re-optimize their decisions infrequently, but in a period of turmoil,
we may be able to observe these changes more readily and relate them to exogenous changes in tax policy. On the
other hand, one could argue that in a weak labor market, families may not have labor supply choices available to
them that they otherwise would have made. The overall impact on the parameter estimates is a priori unclear.
16
when I control for housing price changes.
To understand the context in which the tax reform occurred, it is also worth noting various
relevant features of the Swedish environment.28 Completed fertility of the 1961 birth cohort is
2.03. The percentage of the population currently divorced in 2003 was 11.3%. 75.6% of Swedish
women aged 15-64 participated in the labor market in 2002, and the male labor force participation
rate was 79.4%. Swedish GDP per capita in 1990 was $27,240. Finally, a relatively large fraction
of couples in Sweden cohabitate rather than formally marrying, and the percentage married was
only 45.2% in 2003. The sample of married Swedes is thus selected in certain ways, but it is a
priori unclear whether and how this should affect the parameter estimates.
IV. The LINDA Data
I use the Longitudinal Individual Dataset for Sweden (LINDA), described in detail in Per-
Anders Edin and Peter Fredriksson (2000). Based on the administrative records of the Swedish
government, these data follow individuals and their families longitudinally. I examine yearly data
from 1988 to 1991, inclusive. The data contain approximately 3.35% of the Swedish population,
in addition to family members of these individuals. A random sample of 20% of the immigrants to
Sweden and their families is also included. Prior to restricting the sample, the full data consist of
approximately 950,000 sampled individuals per year, comprising approximately 11% of the Swedish
population.
Gender, age, region of residence, occupation, industry, number of children, educational attain-
ment, and other covariates are included in the data. In the regressions, the values of all of these
control variables are taken from 1989. Most of these covariates are not available in the U.S. admin-
istrative data on tax returns, including the IRS-Michigan-NBER tax panel. My measure of earned
income includes only wages paid from employers to employees (and excludes goverment transfers).
I construct taxable labor income by subtracting certain deductions from earned income. During
the period under consideration, the data do not contain a measure of hours worked. Further
details about the data are contained in Appendix I.
I include in my main sample married individuals who are between 18 and 65 years old (inclu-
sive), whose earned income in the base period is greater than zero, and whose spouses share all
of these characteristics. 200,214 individuals fit these criteria, consisting of 100,107 husbands and
28The statistics in this paragraph are drawn from Blau, Ferber, and Winkler (2005) and Betsey Stevenson and
Justin Wolfers (2007).
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the same number of wives. Summary statistics are shown in Table 2. The mean income in the
sample is SEK 177,159 for husbands and SEK 102,538 for wives.29 Since men tend to have higher
earnings and marginal tax rates are progressive, the mean net-of-tax share of husbands (.50) is
somewhat lower than that of wives (.61). Since virtual income increases as the marginal tax rate
increases (ceteris paribus), and since men have larger capital income than women, it makes sense
that husbands have substantially higher virtual income on average (SEK 31,443 for husbands, as
opposed to SEK 13,436 for wives).
Couples display positive assortative mating. In 1989, their earned incomes have a modest
positive correlation of .21, and the correlation of their net-of-tax shares is .25.30 Pooling the
changes from 1989 to 1990 and from 1990 to 1991, the correlation between the changes in their log
earned incomes is .14, the correlation between the changes in their simulated log net-of-tax shares
is .27, and the correlation between the changes in their actual log net-of-tax shares is .26.
V. Empirical Results
A. Preliminary Evidence
Figure 2 shows the evolution of earnings from 1988-1989, 1989-1990, and 1990-1991, in panels
a, b, and c respectively. The x-axis of the figure shows real taxable income in the base year (1988,
1989, and 1990 in a, b, and c respectively). The y-axis shows mean log real earnings growth among
married individuals from the base year to the final year in each 10,000-SEK range of base year real
taxable income (where the final year is 1989, 1990, and 1991 in a, b and c, respectively). The figure
shows starkly different patterns in 1990-1991 than in the previous years. From 1988-1989, log real
earnings growth is moderately negatively correlated with base year income, consistent with the
mean reversion in income noted in other contexts (e.g. Gottschalk and Moffi tt 1994 on the U.S.).
From 1989-1990, when approximately 1/3 of the tax cuts from TR91 were enacted (with larger
cuts for those with larger incomes), there is a fairly flat relationship between earnings growth and
base year income, consistent with the notion that the larger tax cuts for those with higher earnings
spurred faster earnings growth among this group relative to 1988-1989. From 1990-1991, however,
a starkly different pattern is visible, with a substantial positive correlation between base year
income and earnings growth. This strong positive correlation– and the reversal of the negative
29In 2007 U.S. dollars, these amounts are equivalent to $46,634 in mean earnings for husbands and $27,580 for
wives.
30If an increase in one spouse’s income causes a decrease in the other spouse’s earnings– as the empirics below
show– then the observed positive correlation between spouse’s incomes would understate the positive correlation
that would obtain absent the income effect of one spouse’s income on the other spouse’s labor supply.
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correlation in the period before the tax cuts– is again consistent with the notion that higher tax
cuts for higher-income individuals spurred relatively faster earnings growth in that group.
Figure 3 shows that during the period of the tax reform, larger gains in earned income occurred
in the parts of the income distribution that also experienced larger tax cuts, relative to the period
without the tax reform. As described in Section III, my regressions effectively contrast the change
in the income distribution from 1988 to 1989, to the changes from 1989 to 1990 and from 1990 to
1991, and relate these relative changes to those in marginal tax rates, controlling for other factors.
Figure 3 graphically depicts these relationships.
On the x-axis of Figure 3 is real earned income in the base year (in SEK divided by 10,000).
The squares represent the mean simulated change in the the log of the net-of-tax share from 1990
to 1991 in each 1990 income group within a 10,000-Kronor range, minus the mean simulated change
in the log of the net-of-tax share from 1988 to 1989 in each 1988 income group.31 The circles show
the mean gain in the log of real earned income in each 1990 earned income group from 1990 to
1991, minus the mean gain in the log of real earned income in each 1988 earned income group from
1988 to 1989. Figure 3a shows the graph for husbands, and Figure 3b shows the graph for wives.32
It is evident that there are much larger gains in log real earned income from 1990 to 1991 at the
top of the income distribution, relative to the bottom of the income distribution, than from 1988
to 1989. For both husbands and wives, the line showing the gain in log real earned income and
the line showing the simulated increase in the log net-of-tax share tend to grow quickly with base
year real earned income until about SEK 170,000, after which both lines level off. It is notable
that it is not simply the case that income growth and tax cuts are both higher at higher income
levels, but also that both level off in the same income range.
B. Comparison to Other Periods in Sweden
It is worth noting that inequality is only weakly related to the business cycle in Sweden (Anders
Björklund 1991). The available evidence also shows that inequality does not usually increase more
in the first year of a recession than in subsequent recession years (which is apparent in the work of
Kopczuk, Saez, and Jae Song 2010 on the U.S.). Moreover, the pattern of large relative income
31The simulated change in the net-of-tax share is not monotonically increasing in base year real earned income
because the brackets before and after the tax change do not occur at exactly the same points in the income
distribution, because the tax base changed from 1990 to 1991, and because the marginal tax rate is based on
taxable income (rather than earned income).
32There are few women in the high income ranges– between SEK 180,000 and SEK 250,000, there are only 306
women on average in each 10,000-Kronor range– so it is unsurprising to find substantial volatility in mean earnings
growth in this range.
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gains at the top of the income distribution from 1990 to 1991 survives when partialing out the
effects of characteristics such as industry, occupation, education, age, and interactions of these
variables. This suggests that the large relative decreases in marginal tax rates at the top of the
income distribution help to drive the large increase in inequality in 1991 relative to the surrounding
years.
Furthermore, the period of TR91 shows a notably different pattern of wage growth over the
earnings distribution than other recessionary periods in Sweden. In particular, the period of TR91
shows substantially larger gains at the top of the income distribution relative to the bottom, relative
to these other periods. In order to assess the relative gains at the top and bottom of the earnings
distribution, I examine how wages grew on average for individuals in high- and low-wage industries
in the period of TR91, as well as in periods spanning the previous two recessions in Sweden. In
particular, I examine 1975-1978, 1980-1983, and 1988-1991, periods that span the three recessions
in Sweden observed in my data.33 I calculate mean real earnings for married individuals in each
two-digit industry at the beginning of these periods (in 1975, 1980, and 1988, respectively). I
then correlate mean real earnings by industry at the beginning of the period with mean log real
earnings growth for married individuals over the period in question (1975-1978, 1980-1983, and
1988-91, respectively). The rationale behind this exercise is to assess whether individuals in high-
wage industries were similarly affected relative to individuals in low-wage industries in all three
recessions.
The results show that individuals in high-wage industries increased their earnings by substan-
tially more relative to individuals in low-wage industries in the 1988-1991 period relative to the
1975-1978 or 1980-1983 periods. The correlation between mean initial earnings by industry and
subsequent log real earnings growth of married individuals aged 18-65 is -.11 in 1975-1978 and is
-.12 in 1980-1983; earnings growth was higher in low-wage industries than in high-wage industries
in the two periods of sluggish growth prior to the 1988-1991 period. However, in the 1988-1991
period, this correlation reverses sign and reaches .02. Thus, the 1988-1991 period stands out as dif-
ferent from previous periods of sluggish growth because earnings growth was positively correlated
with mean industry earnings in this period. This is again consistent with the notion that tax cuts
for individuals with high incomes (who tend to be concentrated in high-earnings industries) caused
33The recessions themselves occurred within these periods in 1976-1978, 1981, and 1991. I examine three-year
periods because in the earlier years in the data, I have data only for 1975, 1978, 1980, 1983, and 1985. In order to
examine a comparable 3-year period around TR91, I examine the three years examined in the main analysis in the
paper (1988-1991). These 3-year periods all featured similarly sluggish growth, with a mean real GDP growth rate
of .43% in 1975-78, .93% in 1980-1983, and .90% in 1988-91.
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a larger increase in earnings in high-earnings industries than low-earnings industries, relative to
the experience in previous periods of sluggish growth in Sweden.
C. Basic Results
I anchor the evolution of the income distribution by regressing the change in the log of real
earned income from 1988 to 1989 on a ten-piece spline in own and spousal 1988 log real earned
income and 1988 log real taxable income, as well as control variables. The coeffi cients on the dif-
ferent pieces of the spline are significantly different from each other, indicating that rich controls
for lagged income are warranted. In the main regressions, I instrument for four independent vari-
ables. The first-stage regressions show F-statistics ranging from just over 6,000 to nearly 10,000.
When a given variable is the dependent variable, its predicted value enters highly significantly,
with a coeffi cient between .8 and .9.
Table 3 shows the basic regression results. In columns 1 and 2, I perform regression (5)
for the husband and wife. The controls include age, age squared, number of children below
8, as well as dummies for nine possible levels of education, 24 Swedish regions, and year. I
estimate own uncompensated elasticities of .21 for husbands and .23 for wives. The estimates are
precise, with standard errors of .02 and .03, respectively. These point estimates are lower than
the uncompensated elasticity estimated in Gruber and Saez (around .4) for the population as a
whole, but comparable to the uncompensated elasticities estimated in Gruber and Saez for the low-
and middle-income populations (.18 and .12, respectively), whose mean incomes are more closely
comparable to the sample in Sweden. I find substantial and precisely-estimated own income
elasticities of -.07 for husbands and -.05 for wives, similar to those in Sören Blomquist and Håkan
Selin (2010). The negative sign is consistent with the presumption that leisure is a normal good.
Consistent with the typical finding that women’s labor supply is more elastic than men’s, wives’
own uncompensated elasticity is higher than husbands’, although not much higher.
Given these parameter estimates, it is possible to calculate compensated own and cross elastic-
ities, using the Slutsky equation and the transformation from elasticities into effects at the sample
means. These are shown in the bottom section of the table. The compensated own elasticity
is .41 for husbands and .47 for wives (significantly different from each other, and from zero, at
the 5% significance level). Compensated cross elasticities, .05 and .07 for husbands and wives,
respectively, are also substantial. Both are significantly different from zero (p<.05 and p<.01,
respectively). Interestingly, husbands and wives have similar uncompensated cross elasticities and
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similar compensated cross elasticities. As one would expect, these are smaller than the compen-
sated elasticities with respect to one’s own net-of-tax share. The uncompensated cross elasticities
are not significantly different from zero at conventional levels. Cross income elasticities, -.003 for
husbands and -.02 for wives, are also substantial and significantly different from zero (p<.10 and
p<.01, respectively).
It is theoretically ambiguous whether one’s earnings should rise or fall when the spouse’s tax
rate rises. Parallel with the literature on labor supply, in which the leisure of husbands and
wives could be complementary or substitutable, the "effort" of one spouse (reflected in pre-tax
earnings) could be complementary or substitutable with that of the other. The results show
complementarity: as the net-of-tax share of one’s spouse rises, one’s own earnings rise. A number
of factors could lead to complementarity. If one’s spouse takes more leisure time, it may be more
enjoyable (provide higher marginal utility) to take more leisure time oneself. Complementarity is
also consistent with several forms of social interactions, such as spouses imitating one another.
D. Robustness and Extensions
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, the dependent variable is the residuals of ln(Est /E
s
t−1) (rather
than the residuals of ln[(1 +Est )/(1 +E
s
t−1)]). In other words, in Columns 3 and 4, I do not add 1
to each value of earnings before logging earnings. The specification in Columns 3 and 4 therefore
selects the sample on the basis of an outcome variable: earnings in the final period constitute an
outcome that is affected by the change in marginal tax rates, and those whose earnings are 0 in the
final period are excluded from the regressions in Columns 3 and 4. Selecting the sample on the
basis of an outcome variable in general leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates; thus,
the results in Columns 3 and 4 should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, the specification
in Columns 3 and 4 has the virtue of not adding to earnings before logging them. It is also worth
noting that the specification in Columns 3 and 4 has a different interpretation than the specification
in Columns 1 and 2: Columns 3 and 4 focus more directly on the intensive margin of earnings,
since this specification excludes those individuals in couples in which at least one member does not
participate in the labor market in the final period.34 The estimated coeffi cients are lower than the
estimated coeffi cients in the comparable specification in Columns 1 and 2, but the results are in
the same range in magnitude and significance. It is not surprising that the coeffi cients are lower
in Columns 3 and 4 than in Columns 1 and 2, since the specification employed in Columns 3 and
34The results are similar when I take the sample from Columns 1 and 2 and instead exclude those individuals
who do not participate in the labor market in the final period.
22
4 focuses only on the intensive margin of adjustment. As shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Appendix
Table 1, the results from Columns 1 and 2 are generally insensitive to other choices, such as
adding .5 to earnings before taking the log. The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation represents
another approach that allows me to use raw earnings in my regressions (as opposed adding one to
earnings before logging earnings). The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation approximates the
log transformation and is defined for values of earnings that are zero (e.g. Karen Pence 2006).
Thus, this approach avoids selection on the dependent variable. I apply the inverse hyperbolic
sine transformation to earnings, and then I run the main specification from Columns 1 and 2 of
Table 3, where the dependent variable is instead the residuals of sinh−1(Est )− sinh−1(Est−1). The
results are very similar to the basic results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.35
Columns 5 and 6 add further controls for the 2-digit occupation and the 2-digit industry of both
the husband and wife. These regressions show broadly similar estimates, with slightly smaller
elasticities. The results are also similar when I add more interactions of these variables to the
regression, such as interactions of occupation and industry with education, age, or region.
In Columns 7 and 8, taxable labor income is the dependent variable. The compensated own
elasticity of taxable labor income with respect to the net-of-tax share is .15 for husbands and .09
for wives. Interestingly, the elasticity estimates are not larger than those in the regressions in
which earned income is the dependent variable. This may relate to the fact that in Sweden, the
deductions available both before and after the reform may not have been particularly elastic. For
example, one of the major deductions was for costs associated with commuting to work, and these
choices are typically found to be relatively inelastic with respect to price in the short run.36
One potential concern is that families who received tax cuts of different magnitudes are sys-
tematically different from one another. Typically, the more a husband’s income exceeds his wife’s,
the larger his tax cut will be relative to hers. If shocks to couples were correlated with how
much husbands earned relative to their wives, then the coeffi cient estimates could be biased. To
address this concern, I replace each spouse with a "placebo" spouse, who is chosen randomly from
among all other married individuals of the same gender as the real spouse. I then run the same
regressions as in the main regressions, but with the values of the independent variables of the
35In Columns 3 and 4 of Appendix Table 1, I control for mean percentage housing price growth by county and
year to address the possibility that housing price changes could have affected earnings. The results are very similar
to the basic results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.
36When the dependent variable is defined as in Columns 3 and 4, the results from the specifications in Columns
5, 6, 7, and 8 are very similar in size and magnitude to those in Columns 3 and 4.
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true spouse replaced with the values for the placebo spouse. As expected, the results show no
significant response to the placebo spouse’s incentives.
Chetty (2009) suggests that the response of measures of non-wage compensation to taxation
should be examined in addition to measures of wage compensation for determining the deadweight
cost of taxation. Measures of non-wage compensation show no significant response to taxation
in my data. In particular, I examine the only non-wage perk—company car benefits—that is
consistently measured throughout the sample period.37 When I regress the change in husbands’
or wives’log real company car benefits on the instrumented change in both spouses’log net-of-tax
shares and log real virtual incomes (using the same empirical strategy as above), the coeffi cient
estimates are insignificant (with large confidence intervals). These insignificant responses are
suggestive of the conclusion that changes in earned income represent changes in labor supply,
either through changes in hours worked or changes in effort per hour worked that is reflected in
the pre-tax wage, rather than changes in the form of compensation. This finding is also relevant
to the interpretation of the main results. Spouses’earnings in principle could respond to own net-
of-tax share because the spouses’form of compensation changes, rather than because the spouses’
leisure shifts. For example, in principle it is possible that when one’s net-of-tax share rises, the
form of spouses’compensation shifts away from non-wage and toward wage compensation. This
seems unlikely, and indeed the empirical results bear out that there is no significant response.
However, the large confidence intervals on these estimates and incompleteness of the data on
non-wage benefits prevent firm conclusions on this issue.
E. Implications
My results can be compared with the predictions of the unitary model of family earnings re-
sponses to taxation discussed above. The own income effect for husbands is significantly different
from the cross income effect for husbands (p<.01), and the own income effect for wives is signif-
icantly different from the cross income effect for wives (p<.01). These inequalities represent a
violation of the income pooling prediction of the unitary model, under which own and cross income
effects should be equal. Income pooling is also rejected at the 1% significance level when I test
whether it holds at quantiles of the income distribution other than the mean of income.38 I can-
not reject the unitary model’s prediction of Slutsky symmetry– the equality in equation (10)– at
37Changes in the taxation of many non-wage benefits in TR91 implied that many benefits are measured incon-
sistently before and after the reform in the data.
38In particular, I have tested income pooling at each decile of the distribution of income and reject income pooling
at the 1% significance level at each of these points.
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conventional significance levels. Income pooling is also violated, and Slutsky symmetry is not
violated, when I evaluate the implied effects at values of the independent and dependent variables
other than the sample means.
Using these elasticity estimates, it is possible to calculate counterfactual GDP growth in the
absence of the tax cuts. I assume a Cobb-Douglas production function in capital and labor, and a
labor income share of output of .73 (see Bentolila and Saint-Paul 2003 on Sweden in 1990). Under
these assumptions, if the individuals affected had not received a tax cut, GDP growth would have
risen by 0.2% in 1990 (rather than rising by 1% in 1990) and would have fallen by 3.5% in 1991
(rather than falling by 1.1%). These are in the same range as GDP growth rates in Finland at the
time, where real GDP grew by .5% in 1990 and fell by 6% (more than Sweden) in 1991.
F. Comparison with Standard Empirical Specifications
Tables 4-6 show the results of frequently-estimated econometric specifications, which yield quite
different results than those in Table 3. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, I estimate a standard
specification in which married individuals treat their spouses’income as unearned income. This
specification imposes a restriction– the coeffi cient on one’s own change in log real virtual income
is restricted to be the same as the coeffi cient on the change in the log real income of one’s spouse–
and is therefore a priori undesirable. Own uncompensated elasticities are .58 and .75 for husbands
and wives, respectively. These are much greater than the estimates of .21 and .23 in Columns 1
and 2 of Table 3. The income elasticities, .23 and .20 for husbands and wives, are very large and
of the wrong sign.39 The implied compensated own-elasticities are .43 and .68 for husbands and
wives, respectively, which are also higher than the compensated elasticities in Table 3 (.41 and
.47, respectively). Very similar biases occur in all of the estimates in Table 4 when the dependent
variable is taxable labor income.40
If the leisure of husbands and the leisure of wives are complementary, then we would expect
the standard specification to yield income elasticities that are more positive than the true income
39In principle, it is possible that leisure is an inferior good, which would be consistent with the positive coeffi cient
on the change in log real unearned income. However, it appears implausible that leisure would be so strongly
inferior, and the coeffi cient restriction associated with this specification makes it independently undesirable.
40All of the results from Tables 4-6 remain similar when the dependent variable is the residuals of ln(Est /E
s
t−1)
(rather than the residuals of ln[(1 + Est )/(1 + E
s
t−1)]). In particular, just as Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 show
(in comparison with Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3) that the magnitude of the estimated coeffi cients and standard
errors is cut approximately in half when the dependent variable is the residuals of ln(Est /E
s
t−1) rather than the
residuals of ln[(1 +Est )/(1 +E
s
t−1)], the magnitude of all of the other coeffi cients and standard errors in Tables 3-6
is consistently cut approximately in half when the dependent variable is the residuals of ln(Est /E
s
t−1) rather than
the residuals of ln[(1 + Est )/(1 + E
s
t−1)].
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elasticities.41 Suppose, for example, that a wife receives a tax cut, leading her earned income to
rise. Under complementarity, the tax cut for this wife also leads her husband to earn more. Thus,
a rise in the husband’s earned income is correlated with a rise in the wife’s earned income. Under
the standard specification, the change in the husband’s earned income contributes to the change
in the measure of the wife’s unearned income. Thus, the wife’s unearned income (which includes
the husband’s income in this specification) tends to rise when the wife’s earned income rises, which
contributes to a positive coeffi cient on the wife’s unearned income. Given that income elasticities
are overly positive, it also makes sense that uncompensated elasticities are over-estimated. Ceteris
paribus, a rise in the net-of-tax share will decrease virtual income, since the intersection of the
extended budget segment with the y-axis falls when the net-of-tax share rises. In the specification
of Tables 3 and 4, the change in one’s own log net-of-tax share is therefore negatively correlated
with the change in one’s log real virtual income. Yet when spousal income is included along
with own virtual income in the measure of unearned income, as in the standard specification, this
negative correlation is dulled. Thus, in the specification in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, the
coeffi cient on the change in one’s own log net-of-tax share picks up some of the variation that is
actually attributable to the change in one’s log real virtual income.
To explore the factors responsible for these results, Columns 3 and 4 run the traditional spec-
ification, but with own (instrumented) virtual income entered separately from (uninstrumented)
spousal income. This replicates the specification in Columns 1 and 2, but without the restric-
tion imposed that own virtual income is summed with spousal income in calculating the measure
of own unearned income. The coeffi cient on spousal income is positive and large, whereas the
coeffi cient on own virtual income is negative and large. This is consistent with the assertion
that the positive correlation between the change in spousal income and the change in one’s own
income induces overly positive income effects in Columns 1 and 2. I reject the hypothesis that
the coeffi cient on own virtual income is the same as the coeffi cient on spousal income (p<.01).42
Uncompensated own elasticities and the coeffi cients on own log virtual income are similar to those
in the specification in Table 3. As argued above, it appears that the own uncompensated elasticity
is over-estimated in Columns 1 and 2 because when spousal income is included along with own
virtual income in the measure of unearned income, the own uncompensated elasticity term picks
up variation actually attributable to own virtual income.
41In the presence of substitutable spousal leisure, the estimated income elasticities should be overly negative.
Here I use "leisure" as shorthand to describe the absence of effort, as reflected in pre-tax earnings.
42I also reject the hypothesis that these coeffi cients are equal when I run a specification in which each of these
variables enters the regression linearly (rather than the logarithmic specification in Table 6).
26
To shed more light on the factors driving the results and evaluate to what extent other common
specifications may be biased, Table 5 shows the results of omitting various key right-hand-side
variables. Columns 1 and 2 omit spouse income and show that the coeffi cient on own NTS and
own income are nearly unchanged from the basic specification in Table 3 Columns 1-2. As expected
due to the strong negative correlation of spouse virtual income and spouse NTS, the coeffi cient
on spouse NTS is much more positive than in the Table 3 specification. Columns 3 and 4 omit
the spouse terms entirely from the regressions. Interestingly, this makes little difference to the
estimates of the own elasticities, presumably due to the relatively low correlation between changes
in spouse tax rates seen in the data. Columns 5 and 6 include only own and spouse NTS as
independent variables of interest. As expected due to the negative correlation of virtual income
and NTS, the coeffi cients are substantially larger than in Table 3. The own NTS coeffi cients
are smaller than in Table 4 Columns 1 and 2, presumably because the income effect was so over-
estimated in the Table 4 specification. Columns 7 and 8 estimate the results with only own NTS
as an independent variable, a familiar specification from much of the literature. As before, I find
little difference in the elasticities from the specification in Columns 5 and 6 that also includes
spouse NTS. Evidently ignoring the spouse in an empirical specification makes little difference,
but constraining responses to own and spouse variables makes a large difference.
Table 6 investigates specifications often employed in the literature on the elasticity of taxable
income. In particular, in this literature it is common to include a measure of overall family income
as an independent variable (e.g. Gruber and Saez 2002), disallowing the possibility of separate
effects of each spouse’s income on earnings. In Columns 1 and 2, I investigate the consequences
of this specification. The change in log family virtual income is the change in the log of husband
virtual income plus wife virtual income, and this is instrumented using the predicted change. The
own elasticities are much larger than in the basic specification, whereas the reaction to the spouse’s
net-of-tax share (NTS) is negative rather than positive. It makes sense that the uncompensated
own NTS elasticity is over-estimated: the own NTS is negatively correlated with own virtual
income, and the estimate of the effect of virtual income is less negative in this specification than
the estimated effect of own virtual income in Table 3. The coeffi cient on own NTS therefore picks
up some of the variation that is picked up by own virtual income in Table 3. Likewise, it makes
sense that the effect of the spouse’s NTS is overly negative: the effect of spouse’s income is now
estimated to be more negative than in Table 3 (since spouse’s income and own income are lumped
together), and since spouse’s virtual income is highly negatively correlated with spouse’s NTS, the
coeffi cient on the latter is now more negative than in the Table 3 specification.
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In the U.S., we typically have information on the sum of spouses’ earnings, which is then
related to the family’s marginal tax rate and income. In the Swedish context, spouses have
different marginal tax rates; because the family lacks one marginal tax rate, it does not make
sense to relate overall family income to the family’s marginal tax rate. To address this issue, it is
possible to investigate the results in Sweden when the simulated changes in each spouse’s marginal
labor income tax rate are equal, as in the U.S. context. In Columns 3-5 of Table 6, I regress
earnings on husband’s net-of-tax share, husband income, and wife income, using husband’s earnings
residuals, wife’s earnings residuals, and the sum of husband’s and wife’s earnings residuals as the
dependent variables. As expected, when the sum of husband and wife income is the dependent
variable, the elasticity with respect to each independent variable is the sum of the elasticities for
husbands and wives separately. The regressions with husband’s and wife’s income as the separate
dependent variables are informative because they allow us to disaggregate the overall elasticity
into the separate contributing parts. When I regress earnings on the change in the NTS and
the change in family income in Columns 6-8, I estimate similar uncompensated elasticities but a
substantially higher income elasticity than in Columns 3-5. The higher income elasticity makes
sense, since I sum together husband and wife income before taking the log; if smaller percentage
changes in virtual income are associated with similar percentage changes in family earned income,
the elasticity of family earned income with respect to virtual income is accordingly higher.
VI. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper looks inside the family to uncover rich aspects of spouses’earnings responses to
taxation. I argue that this may lead to new conclusions about the effects of labor income taxation
that were obscured in earlier analyses that estimated more simplified econometric models. The
results reveal that individuals respond substantially to their spouses’ incentives, with sizeable
compensated cross elasticities and cross income effects. A customary specification, which treats
spousal income as unearned income, produces income effects that are wrong-signed and large, and
considerable bias results in the estimates of the uncompensated and compensated own elasticities.
A specification that assumes that individuals respond to overall family taxable income—precluding
the possibility that the response to each spouse’s unearned income is different—may also lead to
substantial biases. Relatedly, specifications that relate overall family earnings to the family’s tax
rate obscure the separate contribution of each spouse’s earnings decision to overall family earnings.
While it has been recognized that these simplified specifications are not fully justified, it has not
been recognized that these simplifications may lead to substantial biases in the resulting parameter
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estimates. The reasons for these substantial differences, relating to the simplifications inherent in
the customary specifications, stand independent of features of the particular Swedish context in
which I estimate the results. The more general lesson, applicable outside of the Swedish context, is
that standard specifications simplify a richer family decision and may therefore lead us astray. The
results suggest that at the least, we should place a premium on gathering data in other contexts on
the separate earnings of each spouse, and relating each spouse’s earnings separately to measures
of both spouses’incentives (including separate measures of the virtual income of each spouse).
These results have implications for models of family taxation. At a basic level, the paper
uncovers a reaction to spousal incentives, suggesting that treating individuals without considering
the incentives of their spouses may be an unwarranted simplification. The unitary model of family
labor income responses to taxation is rejected by the income pooling test, with own income effects
much larger than cross income effects, but I cannot reject Slutsky symmetry. If bargaining power
depends on the family distribution of income but not on the tax rate, this could rationalize these
patterns in the data (Martin Browning, Pierre-André Chiappori, and Valérie Lechene 2006). This
is consistent with a model in which a spouse’s outside option in the marriage market is influenced
by their income but not directly by their hourly wage, and thus their bargaining power within the
marriage depends on their income but not their hourly wage. This makes sense if potential mates
are attracted by the possibility of high income. Overall, the paper suggests a picture of the family
in which wives’labor supply is more elastic than husbands’, spousal leisure is complementary, and
bargaining power depends on income but not much on wages.
Ideally it would be desirable to use these tax policy changes to examine other models of fam-
ily taxpaying behavior, for example by testing of effi ciency of intra-household allocations as in
Browning and Chiappori (1998). However, the LINDA data are not suited to this task: Browning
and Chiappori show that one must observe demands for at least five commodities in order to test
effi ciency, and the LINDA data do not contain information on consumption. Feldstein (1999)
derives a measure of the deadweight cost of taxing labor income under the assumption of a uni-
tary decision-maker. Likewise, the literature on the optimal taxation of the family has typically
assumed a unitary decision-maker (Michael Boskin and Eytan Sheshinski 1983; Henrik Kleven,
Claus Kreiner, and Saez 2009; Louis Kaplow 2008; Patricia Apps and Ray Rees 2009). This paper
suggests that such models could be enriched to account for non-unitary behavior.
Some recent literature has departed from the assumption of a unitary decision-maker in mod-
eling optimal tax policy or the welfare consequences of tax reforms (e.g. Alesina, Ichino, and
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Karabarbounis 2011; Apps and Rees 1988; Apps and Rees 1999; Craig Brett 1998; Chiappori
1992; Olivier Donni 2003; Elisabeth Gugl 2009). My results are supportive of a key prediction
of the Alesina, Ichino, and Karabarbounis (2011) model– that women’s labor supply should be
more elastic than men’s– even in Sweden where gender differences in labor market outcomes are
arguably less dramatic than elsewhere. Further empirical work to validate the predictions of their
model in Sweden– such as predictions relating to the ratio of home work to market work– would
be valuable.
In the model of Chiappori (1992), under some assumptions about the nature of the Pareto-
effi cient collective household process for sharing resources, the parameters of the household bar-
gaining process can be estimated from only the demand for leisure of the husband and wife (as
they relate to household unearned income and the wage rates of the husband and wife). These
parameters can then be used to estimate the welfare consequences of family taxation. If one were
willing to impose this structure on the distribution of family resources, a useful extension of the
work in this paper would be to estimate the parameters of this model. The non-unitary Apps and
Rees (1999) model implies that if male and female uncompensated own and spouse elasticities are
all equal, then in a “traditional”household in which the ratio of male to female labor supply is
above the ratio of average male to average female labor supply, a tax reform in which the wife’s
rate is increased and the husband’s rate is decreased represents a potential Pareto improvement.
The results of my paper suggest that this case does not hold, as own and cross elasticities are not
found to be equal across genders.
As noted above and in Alesina, Ichino, and Karabarbounis (2011), it is noteworthy that the
compensated earnings elasticity of married women is higher than that of married men even in
Sweden. The higher female elasticity has been noted in many other contexts (e.g. Blundell
and MaCurdy 1999). The reasons for these differences are not fully clear, although it is worth
noting that the estimated effect of taxes on earnings—as opposed to the elasticity—is more similar
across genders (e.g. Blomquist and Urban Hansson-Brusewitz 1990). The difference in calculated
elasticities across genders therefore arises in part because the baseline level of labor supply is lower
among women than among men, leading mechanically to a higher calculated elasticity among
women. In the sample in this paper, mean earnings among men (SEK 177,159) is much higher
than mean earnings among women (SEK 102,538), and the compensated earnings elasticity among
women (0.47) is not much higher than that among men (0.41). This functional form issue can
therefore account for the difference in elasticities (relative to effect sizes). Other work has found
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that the female labor supply elasticity may decline as female labor force participation rises (Blau
and Kahn 2007), perhaps in part because of this functional form issue, and perhaps because the
intensive margin of labor supply may be less elastic than the extensive margin.43
The results are also noteworthy insofar as they may reflect changes in labor supply. Taxable
labor income is sometimes thought to reflect a broader measure of labor supply than hours worked
does (Feldstein 1995, 1999). For example, effort per hour worked should influence earned income
by increasing the marginal product and thus the hourly wage. Moreover, Chetty (2009) argues
that taxable earnings responses could provide a better measure of welfare than does taxable income
because earned income responses may be associated with smaller transfer costs. Measures of hours
worked are also subject to substantial measurement error. While earned income will also reflect
changes in the form of compensation– for example, taxation might affect the mix of compensa-
tion between fringe benefits and wage compensation– I find no significant response of non-wage
compensation to the independent variables.
To the extent that these results reflect changes in labor supply, these results may relate to a
long line of literature on family labor supply (e.g. Orley Ashenfelter and James Heckman 1974;
Paul Devereux 2004; Blau and Lawrence Kahn 2007). This literature has often been limited by
the diffi culty of finding exogenous variation in the incentives of the spouse. Interpreted as labor
supply responses, the estimates suggest that the leisure of one spouse is complementary with
the leisure of another (e.g. Jennifer Hunt 1998; Alan Gustman and Thomas Steinmeier 2000;
Daniel Hamermesh 2002). In this context, the results suggest that the customary labor supply
specification, in which labor supply is related to wages or the net-of-tax wage, and one spouse’s
income is treated as the unearned income of the other spouse, can produce substantially biased
estimates. Nonetheless, my estimates are of earnings responses, not labor supply responses, and
thus cannot directly yield information about the labor supply elasticity. As noted above, earnings
could be impacted by several factors other than hours worked. Thus, the empirical results yield
a composite of all of these responses, including hours worked responses and also changes in the
form of compensation, tax avoidance, and tax evasion. The potential implications for labor supply,
therefore, are ultimately speculative. In order to address the relationship between hours worked
and earnings responses conclusively, we must await a different administrative dataset in which
data on hours worked and earnings can be linked.
The ability to examine the effects of separate changes in each spouse’s marginal tax rate has
43However, as I discuss further below, I use earnings as the dependent variable, so the results are not directly
comparable with those of studies that use hours worked as the dependent variable.
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allowed me to go beyond the limitations of standard specifications, and the difference in the
resulting estimates is large. Several European countries have individual taxation and have made
available administrative micro-data on the income of each spouse. This suggests the possibility of
future work in such contexts, which could add to the picture of family earnings decisions emerging
from this paper.
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Appendix I. Additional Data Description
Education dummies are dummies for nine categories measuring highest school attainment. Industry
and occupation are defined at the 2-digit level. Occasional missing values of these covariates are rep-
resented by dummies indicating missing values. For the vast majority of households considered in the
regressions, both spouses’earnings are positive in both base periods (i.e. both 1989 and 1990). However,
a number of households have positive earnings for both household members in the base period in one
of these years but not in the other. Observations for these individuals are included in the regressions
only when the income of both household members is positive in the base year; otherwise, the dependent
variable is a missing value. 200,214 individuals are in households in which both spouses have positive
earnings in at least one of the years examined.
In 1991, Sweden switched from a global tax system, under which the marginal tax rate on earned
income depends on the sum of earned income, capital income, and taxable government transfers (minus
deductions), to a dual tax system, under which the marginal tax rate on earned income is computed only
based on earned income (and deductions and taxable government transfers), and capital income is taxed
at a flat rate. This implies that the proper way to calculate virtual income is different in 1991 than it was
before 1991. Prior to 1991, virtual income is calculated by computing the intersection of the individual’s
extended budget segment with the y-axis in taxable income-consumption space, and adding the value of
untaxed transfers. Predicted virtual income in 1990 is calculated by inflating the value of taxable income
in 1990 by the mean per-person growth in taxable income of individuals in the sample, calculating the
virtual income associated with this predicted budget segment, and adding this amount to the predicted
value of untaxed transfers (calculated by inflating 1989 untaxed transfers by the mean per-person growth
in untaxed transfers from 1989 to 1990 of individuals in the sample).
In 1991, virtual income is computed by adding three quantities: the intersection with the y-axis of the
individual’s extended budget segment in pre-tax taxable labor income-consumption space, the after-tax
value of capital income, and the value of untaxed government transfers. (Here taxable labor income
is taken to include government transfers.) Because of the change in the tax base, in constructing the
instrument for the marginal tax rate for 1991, I project 1991 taxable labor income by multiplying each
individual’s 1990 taxable labor income by the mean per-individual growth in taxable labor income of
individuals in the sample from 1990 to 1991. I calculate predicted virtual income in 1991 by determining
what virtual income would have been in 1991 if an individual had the projected taxable labor income
in 1991, as well as the projected values of capital income and untaxed transfers (calculated by inflating
the values of capital income and untaxed transfers from 1990 by the mean growth from 1990 to 1991 in
the per capita values of these variables of individuals in the sample). Like all income variables, virtual
income is always represented in real terms.
When it enters as a dependent variable in my regressions, I construct taxable labor income by sub-
tracting deductions from earned income. The deductions in question do not include deductions for
interest payments or capital losses. To form a consistent measure of deductions, I exclude those that
were available only before or only after 1991. When I subtract deductions from earned income, the result
is occasionally negative. (Because the sample excludes labor market non-participants, earned income
minus deductions is negative for less than 1% of the sample.) Since I examine the change in the log of
real taxable labor income, and the log of zero or of a negative number is undefined, I set the values of real
taxable labor income equal to 1 for these individuals in the years in which it is negative. The results are
insensitive to this choice. Before 1991, certain deductions could be claimed only against the basic tax
schedule. However, all of the deductions included in my measure of deductions prior to 1991 could be
claimed against both the basic schedule and against the additional schedule. Thus, their marginal tax
price was equal to the net-of-tax share associated with earned income, so a specification that relates my
measure of taxable labor income to this net-of-tax share is appropriate.
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Figure 1. Macroeconomic Variables in Sweden, 1975-2000
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Foreign Labor Statistics. The dashed line shows the yearly growth
rate of real GDP per capita in Sweden in each year from 1975 to 2000. The solid line shows the unemployment
rate in Sweden in each year.
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Figure 2a. Change in Log Real Earnings from 1988 to 1989 vs. Real Taxable Income in 1988
Notes: The figure shows the change in log real earnings from 1988 to 1989 on the y-axis, and real
taxable income in 1988 (expressed in thousands of SEK) on the x-axis. Within each SEK 10,000 range
of real taxable income in the base year, the figure shows the mean change in log real earnings from 1988
to 1989. The figure shows a negative correlation between initial taxable income and subsequent earnings
growth in this period.
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Figure 2b. Change in Log Real Earnings from 1989 to 1990 vs. Real Taxable Income in 1989
Notes: The figure shows the change in log real earnings from 1989 to 1990 on the y-axis, and real
taxable income in 1989 (expressed in thousands of SEK) on the x-axis. Within each SEK 10,000 range of
real taxable income in the base year, the figure shows the mean change in log real earnings from 1989 to
1990. The figure shows little correlation between initial taxable income and subsequent earnings growth
in this period.
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Figure 2c. Change in Log Real Earnings from 1990 to 1991 vs. Real Taxable Income in 1990
Notes: The figure shows the change in log real earnings from 1990 to 1991 on the y-axis, and real
taxable income in 1990 (expressed in thousands of SEK) on the x-axis. Within each SEK 10,000 range of
real taxable income in the base year, the figure shows the mean change in log real earnings from 1990 to
1991. The figure shows a substantial positive correlation between initial taxable income and subsequent
earnings growth in this period.
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Figure 3a. Changes in Earnings and Changes in Net-of-Tax Shares of Husbands, by Base Year Income
Group
Notes: The figure shows that larger gains in real earned income took place in the same parts of the income
distribution that experienced larger cuts in marginal tax rates, and that both rise until approximately the same
point in the income distribution, at which point both lines level off. On the x-axis is real earned income (in Swedish
Kronor) in the base year, divided by 10,000. The squares represent the mean simulated change in the log of the
net-of-tax share (NTS) from 1990 to 1991 in each base-year income group (within a 10,000-Kronor range), minus
the mean simulated change in the log of the net-of-tax share from 1988 to 1989 in each base-year income group.
The mean simulated change in the log of the net-of-tax share is not monotonically increasing in base year real
earned income because the brackets before and after the tax change do not occur at exactly the same points in the
income distribution, because the tax base changed from 1990 to 1991, and because the marginal tax rate is based
on taxable income (not earned income). The circles show the mean gain in the log of real earned income from 1990
to 1991 in each base year earned income group, minus the mean gain in the log of real earned income from 1988 to
1989 in each base year earned income group.
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Figure 3b. Changes in Earnings and Changes in Net-of-Tax Shares of Wives, by Base Year Income
Group
Notes: The figure shows that larger gains in real earned income took place in the same parts of the income
distribution that experienced larger cuts in marginal tax rates, and that both rise until approximately the same
point in the income distribution, at which point both lines level off. On the x-axis is real earned income (in Swedish
Kronor (SEK)) in the base year, divided by 10,000. The squares represent the mean simulated change in the log of
the net-of-tax share (NTS) from 1990 to 1991 in each base-year income group (within a 10,000-SEK range), minus
the mean simulated change in the log of the net-of-tax share from 1988 to 1989 in each base-year income group.
The mean simulated change in the log of the net-of-tax share is not monotonically increasing in base year real
earned income because the brackets before and after the tax change do not occur at exactly the same points in the
income distribution, because the tax base changed from 1990 to 1991, and because the marginal tax rate is based
on taxable income (not earned income). The circles show the mean gain in the log of real earned income from 1990
to 1991 in each base year earned income group, minus the mean gain in the log of real earned income from 1988
to 1989 in each base year earned income group. It is unsurprising that in the higher income ranges, wives’mean
income gains exhibit substantial volatility, since between SEK 180,000 and SEK 250,000, on average there are only
306 women in each 10,000-Kronor range.
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Table 1. Marginal Tax Rates by Income and Year
1989 Schedule 1991 Schedule
Bracket Start Bracket End MTR Bracket Start Bracket End MTR
0 70,000 .36 0 149,284 .31
70,000 140,000 .51 149,284 – .51
140,000 190,000 .65
190,000 – .76
Source: Statistics Sweden. “MTR”refers to the marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rate is calculated by
summing the Swedish state marginal tax rate with the average sum of local and municipal marginal tax rates (31%
both before and after the reform). All amounts shown in the table are in real 1989 Swedish Kronor (SEK). In
nominal terms, the end of the first bracket in 1991 was SEK 180,300. In 1989, an individual’s tax liability was the
sum of his or her liabilities on two different tax schedules, the basic tax schedule and the additional tax schedule.
"Additional taxable income" refers to the measure of taxable income on the basis of which the liability on the
additional tax schedule was calculated; "basic taxable income" refers to the measure of taxable income on the basis
of which the liability on the basic tax schedule was calculated. Additional taxable income differed from basic
taxable income because one could claim more deductions on the basic schedule than on the additional schedule.
The additional schedule applied to individuals whose additional taxable income was above SEK 140,000. The tax
schedule shown above for 1989 assumes that basic taxable income is equal to additional taxable income. The tax
base also shifted in a number of ways from 1989 to 1991. For example, before 1991, the marginal tax rate on earned
income was calculated as a function of both capital and labor income, whereas starting in 1991, capital income
became irrelevant to the calculation of the marginal tax rate on earned income. “– ” indicates that the bracket
continues at all higher levels of income.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Husbands Wives
Mean SD Mean SD
Earnings 177,159 92,791 102,538 49,070
Taxable Labor Income 165,137 77,684 94,894 46,267
Age 43.75 8.99 41.17 8.86
Children < 18 1.48 1.17 1.48 1.17
Net-of-Tax Share .50 .11 .61 .09
Virtual Income 31,433 69,947 13,436 73,754
Source: LINDA data. The sample contains 200,214 individuals, of whom 100,107 are husbands and 100,107
are wives. The sample includes only married Swedes who are not self-employed, do not hold shares in a closely
held corporation, are between 18 and 65 years old (inclusive), whose earnings are greater than zero in 1989 or 1990,
and whose spouses share these characteristics. The values of the variables are from 1988 and are expressed in 1988
SEK. The net-of-tax share is defined as one minus the marginal tax rate. Taxable labor income is calculated by
subtracting certain deductions from earned income, as described in Appendix I.
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Table 3. IV Regressions of the Change in Log Real Earnings or Log Real Taxable Labor Income on
the Change in both Spouses’Log Net-of-Tax Shares and Log Real Virtual Incomes
Earned Inc. Taxable Labor Inc.
(1) H (2) W (3) H (4) W (5) H (6) W (7) H (8) W
∆Own .21 .23 .09 .08 .18 .19 .15 .09
NTS (.02)*** (.03)*** (.01)*** (.01)*** (.02)*** (.02)*** (.02)*** (.03)***
∆Spouse .03 .03 .002 -.007 .02 .02 .05 .04
NTS (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02)
∆Own -.07 -.05 -.03 -.02 -.05 -.04 -.03 .006
Income (.005)*** (.002)*** (.003)*** (.001)*** (.005)*** (.002)*** (.005)*** (.002)***
∆Spouse -.003 -.02 .003 -.008 -.0002 -.01 -.001 -.01
Income (.002)* (.004)*** (.001)*** (.002)*** (.002) (.004)*** (.002) (.004)***
Add’l. Controls? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 100,107 100,107 96,981 96,657 100,107 100,107 100,107 100,107
Compensated .41 .47 .17 .18 .32 .38 .23 .07
Own Elasticity (.02)*** (.02)*** (.02)*** (.02)*** (.02)*** (.02)*** (.03)*** (.03)**
Compensated .05 .07 -.01 .02 .02 .07 .06 .06
Cross Elasticity (.02)** (.02)*** (.02) (.04) (.03) (.02)** (.03)** (.03)**
Notes: The dependent variable in Columns 1-2 and 5-6 is the residuals of ln[(1+Et)/(1+Et−1)]. E is earned
income. The residuals are calculated by partialing out the predicted effect of lagged income, as described in the
text. “∆Own NTS” is ln[(1-MTRt)/(1-MTRt−1)], where MTR is one’s own marginal tax rate. “∆Own Income”
is ln[(1+VIt)/(1+ VIt−1)], where VI is one’s own virtual income. “∆Spouse NTS” and “∆Spouse Income” are
the analogs. In Columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the residuals of ln(Et/Et−1), where E is earned income.
Because it is not possible to take the log of zero, I include only observations on individuals in couples in which
both members have positive earnings in both the base year and the final year. Since couples are selected on the
basis of an outcome variable (i.e. earnings Et), the results should be interpreted with caution. The sample includes
married Swedes who are not self-employed, do not hold shares in a closely held corporation, are between 18 and
65 years old (inclusive), whose earnings are positive in 1989 or 1990, and whose spouses share these characteristics.
The years examined are 1989-90 and 1990-91. All regressions control for year dummies and the 1988 values of
age, age squared, number of children, and dummies for education level and region. “Add’l. Controls”means that
2-digit industry and occupation dummies for both spouses and interactions of all of the controls with year dummies
are included. “H”and "W" denote regressions for husbands and wives, respectively. “N”is the total number of
individuals in the regressions. In Columns 7 and 8, the dependent variable is the residuals of taxable labor income.
Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Comparison with Other Specifications: IV Regressions of Husbands’ and Wives’Change
in Log Real Earnings on the Instrumented Change in Own Log Net-of-Tax Share and the Instrumented
Change in a measure of Log Real Unearned Income or the Instrumented Change in Spouse’s Log Net-of-
Tax Share
(1) H (2) W (3) H (4) W
∆Own NTS .58 .75 .21 .23
(.02)*** (.03)*** (.02)*** (.03)***
∆Virtual Inc. .23 .20
+∆Spouse Inc. (.01)*** (.01)***
∆Virtual Inc. -.07 -.05
(.005)*** (.002)***
∆Spouse Inc. .12 .12
(.005)*** (.006)***
N 100,107 100,107 100,107 100,107
Notes: The dependent variable is the residuals of ln[(1+Et)/(1+Et−1)], where E denotes earnings and the
subscript denotes the year. The residuals are calculated by partialing out the predicted effect of lagged in-
come on the true value of ln[(1+Et)/(1+Et−1)], using the 1988-9 evolution of the income distribution to deter-
mine the coeffi cients, as described in the text. “∆Own NTS” is ln[(1-MTRt)/(1-MTRt−1)], where MTR refers
to one’s own marginal tax rate and the subscript refers to the year. “∆Virtual Inc.+∆Spouse Inc.” refers to
ln[(1+(VI+SI)t)/(1+(VI+SI)t−1)], where VI is the individual’s own virtual income and the subscript refers to the
year, and SI is actual spousal income in the year in question. “∆Virtual Inc.” refers to ln[(1+VIt)/(1+VIt−1)],
and "∆Spouse Inc." is defined similarly. The sample includes only married Swedes who are not self-employed, do
not hold shares in a closely held corporation, are between 18 and 65 years old (inclusive), whose earnings are greater
than zero in 1989 or 1990, and whose spouses share these characteristics. The years included in the regressions
are 1989-1990 and 1990-1991, when the tax changes occurred. These years are pooled in the regressions. All
regressions control for year dummies and the 1988 values of age, age squared, number of children, dummies for nine
education levels, and dummies for 24 regions. “H”refers to regressions for husbands, and “W”refers to regressions
for wives. “N” refers to the total number of individuals included in the regressions, the vast majority of whom
appear in both 1989-1990 and 1990-1991. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses. ***, **, and
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5. Comparison with Other Specifications: IV Regressions of Husbands’and Wives’Change in
Log Real Earnings on the Instrumented Change in Own Log Net-of-Tax Share, the Instrumented Change
in Spouse’s Log Net-of-Tax Share, and/or the Instrumented Change in Log Real Own Unearned Income
(1) H (2) W (3) H (4) W (5) H (6) W (7) H (8) W
∆Own .21 .22 .21 .23 .42 .67 .43 .68
NTS (.02)*** (.03)*** (.02)*** (.03)*** (.02)*** (.03)*** (.02)*** (.03)***
∆Spouse .06 .08 .07 .08
NTS (.03)** (.02)*** (.03)*** (.02)***
∆Own -.07 -.05 -.07 -.05
Income (.005)*** (.002)*** (.005)*** (.002)***
N 100,107 100,107 100,107 100,107 100,107 100,107 100,107 100,107
Notes: The dependent variable is the residuals of ln[(1+Et)/(1+Et−1)]. E is earned income. The residuals are
calculated by partialing out the predicted effect of lagged income, as described in the text. “∆Own NTS”is ln[(1-
MTRt)/(1-MTRt−1)], where MTR is one’s own marginal tax rate. “∆Own Income” is ln[(1+VIt)/(1+ VIt−1)],
where VI is one’s own virtual income. “∆Spouse Income”is the analog. The sample includes married Swedes who
are not self-employed, do not hold shares in a closely held corporation, are between 18 and 65 years old (inclusive),
whose earnings are positive in 1989 or 1990, and whose spouses share these characteristics. The years examined
are 1989-90 and 1990-91. All regressions control for year dummies and the 1988 values of age, age squared, number
of children, and dummies for education level and region. “H”and "W" denote regressions for husbands and wives,
respectively. “N”is the total number of individuals in the regressions. Standard errors clustered by individual are
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
48
Table 6. Comparison with Other Specifications: IV Regressions of Husbands’or Wives’Change in Log
Real Earnings, or the Sum of Changes in Husbands’or Wives’in Log Real Earnings, on the Instrumented
Change in Spouses’ or Family Log Net-of-Tax Share, the Instrumented Change in Husband Log Real
Unearned Income, the Instrumented Change in Wife Log Real Unearned Income, or the Instrumented
Change in Log Real Family Unearned Income
(1) H (2) W (3) H (4) W (5) Sum (6) H (7) W (8) Sum
∆Own .32 .57
NTS (.02)*** (.03)***
∆Spouse -.01 -.05
NTS (.03) (.02)***
∆Family .43 .18 .61 .44 .19 .63
NTS (.07)*** (.06)*** (.10)*** (.07)*** (.06)*** (.11)***
∆Husb -.10 -.05 -.15
Income (.02)*** (.01)*** (.03)***
∆Wife -.02 -.06 -.08
Income (.02) (.01)*** (.03)***
∆Fam. -.05 -.06 -.12 -.11 -.23
Income (.006)*** (.006)*** (.01)*** (.008)*** (.01)***
N 100,107 100,107 27,231 27,231 27,231 27,231 27,231 27,231
Notes: “H”and "W" denote regressions for husbands and wives, respectively, in which the dependent variable is
the residuals of ln[(1+Et)/(1+Et−1)], where E denotes the earned income of husbands or wives, respectively. In the
columns labeled "Sum," the dependent variable is the change in the sum of the residuals of the log earned income of
the husband and wife summed. Columns 1 and 2 are based on the full sample, and Columns 3-8 limit the sample to
those observations that have the same simulated changes in their NTS, which I call “∆Family NTS.”The residuals
are calculated by partialing out the predicted effect of lagged income, as described in the text. “∆Husb NTS”
is ln[(1-MTRt)/(1-MTRt−1)], where MTR is one’s own marginal tax rate. “∆Husb Income” is ln[(1+VIt)/(1+
VIt−1)], where VI is one’s own virtual income. “∆Wife NTS”and “∆Wife Income”are the analogs. “∆Family
Income” refers to ln[(VIht+VIwt)/(VIht−1+VIwt−1)], where VI refers to virtual income. The sample includes
married Swedes who are not self-employed, do not hold shares in a closely held corporation, are between 18 and
65 years old (inclusive), whose earnings are positive in 1989 or 1990, and whose spouses share these characteristics.
The years examined are 1989-90 and 1990-91. All regressions control for year dummies and the 1988 values of
age, age squared, number of children, and dummies for education level and region. “N” is the total number of
individuals in the regressions. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table 1. Alternative Specifications: IV Regressions of the Change in Log Real Earnings
on the Instrumented Change in both Spouses’Net-of-Tax Shares and the Instrumented Change in both
Spouses’Real Virtual Incomes
(1) H (2) W (3) H (4) W
∆Own .23 .27 .23 .24
NTS (.02)*** (.03)*** (.02)*** (.03)***
∆Spouse .002 -.002 .07 .05
NTS (.03) (.02) (.03)** (.02)***
∆Own -.08 -.06 -.09 -.07
Income (.005)*** (.002)*** (.005)*** (.002)***
∆Spouse -.003 -.02 -.007 -.02
Income (.002) (.004)*** (.002)*** (.004)***
∆Virtual Inc.
+∆Spouse Inc.
N 100,107 100,107 100,107 100,107
Notes: The dependent variable in Columns 1-2 is the residuals of ln[(.5+Et)/(.5+Et−1)]. ∆Own NTS”is ln[(1-
MTRt)/(1-MTRt−1)], where MTR is one’s own marginal tax rate, and “∆Own Income”refers to ln[(1+VIt)/(1+
VIt−1)], where VI is one’s own virtual income. “∆Spouse NTS”and “∆Spouse Income”are the analogs. Columns
3-4 adopt the specification of Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 but additionally control for mean percentage housing
price growth in the county and year. The sample includes only married Swedes who are not self-employed, do not
hold shares in a closely held corporation, are between 18 and 65 years old (inclusive), and whose spouses share
these characteristics. The years examined are 1989-90 and 1990-91. All regressions control for year dummies and
the 1988 values of age, age squared, number of children, dummies for nine education levels, and dummies for 24
regions. "H”refers to regressions for husbands, and “W”to those for wives. “N”is the total number of individuals
included in the regressions. Standard errors clustered by individual are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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